Créer un compteSe connecter

Recherches récentes

Aucune recherche récente

Options de recherche

Disponible uniquement lorsque vous êtes connecté.
mastouille.fr est l'un des nombreux serveurs Mastodon indépendants que vous pouvez utiliser pour participer au fédiverse.
Mastouille est une instance Mastodon durable, ouverte, et hébergée en France.

Administré par :

Statistiques du serveur :

635
comptes actifs

mastouille.fr: À proposAnnuaire des profilsPolitique de confidentialité

Mastodon: À proposTélécharger l’applicationRaccourcis clavierVoir le code sourcev4.3.4

#hacking

82 messages28 participants0 message aujourd’hui
Public
Redhotcyber

Il Grande Firewall cinese può essere superato. Il progetto della provincia cinese di Hainan

📌 Link all'articolo : redhotcyber.com/post/il-grande

Nella provincia cinese di Hainan è iniziato un esperimento che potrebbe cambiare l’approccio tradizionale del Paese alla censura di internet. Le aziende locali hanno ora #accesso a un #servizio chiamato Global Connect, che consente loro di aggirare legalmente il Grande Firewall cinese e accedere all’internet globale, inclusi #Google, YouTube e Wikipedia.

#redhotcyber#hacking#cti
Public
Laurent Cheylus

SmartAttack: a new type of Attack that uses Smartwatches to secretly steal Data from air-gapped Systems. The attack uses ultrasonic Signals that Smartwatches can pick up and decode. - Paper available on arXiv #Infosec #Hacking arxiv.org/abs/2506.08866v1

arXiv logo
arXiv.orgSmartAttack: Air-Gap Attack via SmartwatchesAir-gapped systems are considered highly secure against data leaks due to their physical isolation from external networks. Despite this protection, ultrasonic communication has been demonstrated as an effective method for exfiltrating data from such systems. While smartphones have been extensively studied in the context of ultrasonic covert channels, smartwatches remain an underexplored yet effective attack vector. In this paper, we propose and evaluate SmartAttack, a novel method that leverages smartwatches as receivers for ultrasonic covert communication in air-gapped environments. Our approach utilizes the built-in microphones of smartwatches to capture covert signals in real time within the ultrasonic frequency range of 18-22 kHz. Through experimental validation, we assess the feasibility of this attack under varying environmental conditions, distances, orientations, and noise levels. Furthermore, we analyze smartwatch-specific factors that influence ultrasonic covert channels, including their continuous presence on the user's wrist, the impact of the human body on signal propagation, and the directional constraints of built-in microphones. Our findings highlight the security risks posed by smartwatches in high-security environments and outline mitigation strategies to counteract this emerging threat.
ExplorerFlux en direct
À propos