@jwildeboer Additional recommendations for hardening your #Signal #SignalMessenger application:
* Also install #Orbot, and have all Signal traffic routed through it.
* Configure Orbot to *not* use reduced padding.
* Configure Orbot to use different routes for all hosts, ports, and clients.
* Configure the Orbot VPN to be always-on (Android VPN settings).
* Configure Signal to allow sealed sender from anybody.
* Configure Signal to require PIN for re-registration.
* Configure Signal's chat defaults to erase after a certain period of time.
Signal is a big juicy target with tons of metadata about who is talking to who going over the wire at any given time. The contents of the communication are encrypted, but the metadata is not. And remember: "we kill people based on metadata" (https://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2014/05/ex-nsa-chief-we-kill-people-based-on-metadata). If the fascists are willing to kill people based off of metadata, then they're certainly willing to surveil, harass, arrest, and imprison people based off of metadata.
These hardening efforts make building up a social graph from metadata more difficult. Unfortunately, you have to do it yourself, as Signal has made it clear on multiple occasions that it does not view network-layer anonymity as within its scope:
>Signal instantly dismissed my report, saying it wasn't their responsibility and it was up to users to hide their identity: "Signal has never attempted to fully replicate the set of network-layer anonymity features that projects like Wireguard, Tor, and other open-source VPN software can provide".
>
>https://gist.github.com/hackermondev/45a3cdfa52246f1d1201c1e8cdef6117
@signalapp @torproject